While the opposition movement against the government of Prime Minister Najib bin Razak is expanding in Malaysia, the government's inability to develop satisfactory policies in this process is causing the country's political agenda to evolve into an increasingly narrow and chaotic environment. While the 'People's Front Coalition', which constitutes the opposition ranks and has been the pioneer of the 'reform' movement in the country since 1999, has evolved into a new phase after the re-imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim and the approaches of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), which have been criticized by the coalition partners, Nazri bin Razak, the Prime Minister's brother and Chairman of the CIMB Group, one of the most important financial institutions in the country, has started to form a new party. While large sections of Malaysian society are looking for a way out amidst the diversity of opposition, a brief look at the recent past is necessary to put today's developments in a healthy perspective. When Najib bin Razak took over as Prime Minister from Abdullah Badawi in April 2009, there was an impression that a wave of 'reform' would sweep the country, which never came but was embraced with new hope.<\/p>\n
There is no doubt that the Prime Minister's aim to give the country a new face and thereby consolidate his political legitimacy has been a driving force in this process, as well as an effort to realize the \"2020 Vision\", which aims to bring the country into the class of developed countries as a matter of national policy. However, as symbolically demonstrated by the borrowing of the word 'reform' from the opposition by the 'United Malay National Union' (UMNO)-led National Front government, which has predominantly targeted rural voters in terms of its vote potential and policy appeal, the Prime Minister has now shifted his focus from the ossified rural electorate to the urban electorate with its multi-ethnic\/ethnic\/religious composition and different and updated demands.<\/p>\n
This approach, which could be considered as a kind of investment for the next elections, was also a candidate to form the basis for reconciliation between social elements that did not 'touch' each other. In fact, the Prime Minister's policies to include ethnic minority groups across the country, especially those of Chinese and Indian origin, and his participation in their events and 'getting in the same frame' with their social leaders have helped to spread an air of optimism. In fact, this orientation in the national political arena and in the social framework meant a threshold to be crossed not only for Prime Minister Najib bin Razak but also for UMNO.<\/p>\n
For the Prime Minister, the justification of this orientation was as much about securing the next election as it was about locking in the Chinese, who, as I mentioned above, are at the forefront of the social production forces needed to achieve the 2020 Vision, and in this context, the 'nation state' consciousness, which has not been brought to a desirable level for nearly fifty-seven years, was gradually finding a response in society. Within the framework of this orientation, the opening that the citizen on the street would soon feel was put forward in the form of support for education, health and religious institutions, while in the superstructure, it was to activate the business circles in new investments and new economic goals, especially in parallel with regional and global developments. In Najib bin Razak's exit, it is not possible to talk about an 'invented' situation. What the Prime Minister did was to borrow the 'political rhetoric' of the opposition, which since 1999 has displayed a 'reform-oriented' orientation that has gradually increased its power in the country's politics by resonating with the multi-ethnic and multi-religious social structure.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the Prime Minister and, of course, the government's practices in the first few years, with its promises that it promised to put into practice in the near future, were close indicators that it was on the right track. However, what the Prime Minister had to overcome was not limited to borrowing the discourse of the opposition, which had emerged with a new political and social order, and trying to project it directly to the people. Beyond this, he had to deal with the fact that, perhaps more so, hints of a negative reaction in UMNO's cadres, which spread hierarchically from the center to the periphery, produced by a kind of 'confidence' of having been in power for so many years and a kind of 'fear' that this power would be lost, began to emerge over time. At this point, it is questionable how successful Najib bin Razak has been in steering his party and the government around borrowed rhetoric, subject to a structure that is more dependent on the support of the UMNO general assembly, which also functions as a mechanism of 'political pressure', rather than, for example, a charismatic leadership profile like Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and the 'steerability' that this provides.<\/p>\n
In the 13th General Elections held on May 5, 2013, the urban electorate responded to UMNO and its alliance with Chinese\/Indian parties by not voting for UMNO in the 13th General Elections. Although the 'official' results of the election showed that the National Front remained in power, of the overall vote went to the opposition 'Popular Front' coalition. In this context, May 5 marked the beginning of a \"twin crisis\" for the Prime Minister. On the one hand, by not repealing the 'Sedition Act', which was enacted during the colonial period in 1948 and which was intended to 'silence' a wide range of people in opposition to the government and UMNO, such as members of parliament, journalists, lecturers, activists, etc., leading to a continued backlash from the opposition; and on the other hand, the reactivity generated by the uneasiness caused by the significant loss of votes in the ruling coalition circles, especially UMNO, began to surface.<\/p>\n
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When one looks at how the Prime Minister and the government have responded to these two crises, there has been a return to traditional policies of what can frankly be described as isolationism. In this context, it is possible to say that the decision was made to continue the process of enriching the groups that sustain the ruling UMNO and its allied parties from the country's relatively dominant investment climate, while pursuing 'attritionist' policies that target the leaders of the so-called opposition through various manipulations. This is how the process of change and transformation initiated by the Prime Minister in 2009 to bring about a new vision for the country has stalled, and how UMNO has been left with the option of reverting to its old reflexes in order to continue to exist within the ruling apparatus.<\/p>\n