Mehmet Özay 23.06.2018
July 15th is the second year of the coup. It is now common knowledge that the coup did not emerge as a purely national problem. Beyond the national structure of the terrorist and putschist structure in question, which was created by instrumentalizing the Turkish society and belief structure as much as possible, it is possible to say that the terrorist and putschist structure in question has more of an international structure in its ability to bravely attempt this terror and coup. At this point, it is obvious that this structure is linked to international power circles in the context of various interests through its international structures and cadres, which are said to be created by the structure itself.
The fact that it claims to have proven itself in individual countries and in internationally representative structures has led to an exponential growth in the power of this terrorist organization on a national scale. Therefore, if this formation is to be understood, its international dimension needs to be thoroughly discussed as much as its national dimension and even more than that. However, the institutions through which this can be done are equally problematic.
Another aspect of this problem is the extent to which the state, which emerges as the sole political and legitimacy structure at the national level, has the ability and power to represent itself in individual countries and international structures.
It is important how the Turkish state, in the classical and traditional sense of the word, is perceived and what it corresponds to in, for example, 'friendly' countries, especially in the aftermath of the coup until today.
It is also worth raising the question of the representativeness of the structures and individuals responsible for representing the state in the respective countries. These questions perhaps needed to be answered a few decades ago, but today they are urgent.
At this point, it would be useful to draw attention to the following point. The competencies of the institutions and the people working in these institutions, which have the important and serious responsibility of being the representative of the state, are meaningful with their recognition in all civilian areas of that society, starting from the state levels in the relevant countries.
At this point, it is clear from the developments to date that this structure has used all legitimate and illegitimate - or we can also call it moral and immoral - means to increase its recognition in the relevant countries and international structures, as well as the development and growth of the formation, which is now called a terrorist structure, which is identified by some as the pioneering force of a period and for which all opportunities were recruited to open all doors in front of it.
However, the responsibilities of this terrorist structure in positioning itself as an apparatus in front of the state must be placed in their proper place. At this point, the responsibilities of those who work in the relevant official institutions, of those who are in charge, of those who are in the position of taking care of the structure that yesterday said "I am the state" and today is known as a terrorist organization, and of those who, in one way or another, are trying to gain a share of power by joining this structure that contains power, cannot be simplified.
It should not be forgotten that the problem that Turkey tried to solve two years ago meant that not only the last twenty years of the country's life, but perhaps twice that amount of time and the opportunities available in this period of time were wasted. This situation makes it necessary to determine the responsibilities of the individuals and institutions representing Turkey.
This is because this situation is linked to the attempts to isolate Turkey after the coup attempt, even in countries that are called friends. Of course, it may not be possible for the people and institutions representing Turkey to have a complete command of the social and political structures, from politics to social structure, history to culture, of the countries they are in within the context of their areas of responsibility. However, whether there is a healthy accumulation of knowledge in this regard, and if there is no such accumulation, the responsibilities of those who are responsible for this are also waiting to be clearly revealed today.
The lack of such a track record may have led to a failure to cooperate with various political and social structures in the relevant countries in the aftermath of the coup attempt. And this may have led to a failure to turn back from the damage caused to Turkey by the coup attempt when it could have been reversed as soon as possible, and may have blocked the path that could have led to an increased presence of Turkey as a strong partner in those countries.
At this point, there is no doubt that in order to find the answer to what the coup means and what kind of isolation Turkey is being left to today, especially in the individual countries concerned and in the international arena, it is necessary to look back not to the aftermath of the coup or just before it, but to a few decades before the coup.
English and Indonesian versions translated with DeepL AI
